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ABSTRACT
This paper empirically examines how governments actually use environmental taxes, by looking to
what extent their resort to this type of taxation is consistent with three alternative interpretations
of environmental taxes proposed by the welfare economics theoretical literature: the strict and the
broad Pigouvian and the double dividend hypotheses. We also extend our analysis to an alter-
native vision of politics, the Leviathan model, to verify how governments that are imperfectly
accountable use environmental taxes. Each theory leads to alternative testable hypotheses, which
we verify on a sample that minimizes the analysts’ discretionary evaluations, the EU-28 countries
that committed themselves to reducing the greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. The estimates lend
support to the strict Pigouvian hypothesis and, to a lesser extent, to a version of the double
dividend hypothesis, where personal income taxes are ‘recycled’ by environmental ones. The other
interpretations do not appear consistent with the data.
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I. Introduction1
This paper empirically analyzes how governments
actually use environmental taxes (henceforth, ET), in
particular to what extent theories about environmen-
tal taxation guide governments’ environmental fiscal
policies.
We try to answer these research questions in the
context of the sample of the 28 EU countries that in
2009 formally committed themselves to attaining
a specific environmental protection target: the reduc-
tion of Green House Gases (henceafter, GHG). Two
features make this sample especially suitable for our
analysis. First, GHG reduction is a clearly measurable
objective, as the member countries have engaged
themselves to collectively reducing such emissions
to 70% of the 1990 levels by 2020.2 Second, these
countries have chosen both their collective and their
country-specific reduction targets themselves. Both
features reduce to a strict minimum the analysts’
discretion in the evaluation of the governments’ use
of ET; this is at the same time a quite desirable and
difficult to find feature among the other studies in the
empirical literature about environmental policy,
where it is usually the analyst, not the governments
under study, who subjectively selects the policy goal
and its degree of attainment.
The surveys of the theoretical literature on envir-
onmental taxation (Baumol and Oates 1988; Oates
and Portney 2003; Sandmo 2000, 2010; OECD 2011;
Bovenberg and Goulder 2002) identify four alterna-
tive theoretical underpinnings to rationalize govern-
ments’ resort to ET. Three of them presuppose
a benevolent government that maximizes social wel-
fare, while the fourth one, the Leviathan model,
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Rennes, France
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2Article 2.1 of decision 406/2009 defines the GHG emissions as ‘ . . . the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluor-
ocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), [. . .] expressed in terms of tons of carbon dioxide equivalent’. The same decision
commits the EU member countries collectively to reduce GHG to 70% of their 1990 levels by the year 2020. In addition to this EU wide target, the Decision sets
also country-specific targets, to account for the economic and environmental starting point situations of each country, especially those of the former Eastern
European nations. (Annexe II to Decision 4006/2009). Furthermore, the EU member states’ targets are given by the EU Effort Sharing Decision where ‘Member
States’ reduction efforts should be based on the principle of solidarity between Member States [. . .] taking into account the relative per capita GDP of Member
States’. Furthermore, the national 2020 targets apply to non-Exchange Trade System emissions, a crucial fact, since it allows analysing the impact of ET in
reducing a type of emissions and in sectors where an important policy instrument, such as ETS, do not operate (preliminary n. 6 of decision 406/2009).
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assumes that governments maximize tax revenues.
This alternative approach is useful to verify how an
imperfectly accountable government may use ET. In
policy terms, these four categories identify as many
ways to employ ET revenues in the correction of the
environmental externality. The first is the classical
Pigouvian interpretation, whereby ET are sufficient
to internalize negative environmental spillovers,
provided that the rates are correlated with the
externality in a first or second best way. In this ‘strict’
conception of the Pigouvian tax the revenues gener-
ated must not be reinvested in the correction of that
externality, to avoid further distortions (Baumol and
Oates 1988; Jacobs and de Mooij 2015; Cremer,
Gahvari, and Ladoux 1998). A second, looser version
of this hypothesis, which stems from the public
policy literature (Fouquet and Johanson 2008;
Kosonen and Nicodème 2009; OECD 2011;
Hoerner and Bosquet 2001; Sterner and Isaksson
2006) and from recent contributions to the literature
on environmental tax reform (Acemoglu et al. 2012;
Bovenberg, Goulder, and Jacobsen 2008; Gersbach
and Requate 2004) holds that the complexity of
environmental policies requires that ET be jointly
used with other environmental policy instruments,
including the revenues from ET, which should be
reinvested in pursuit of environmental goals. As this
interpretation relaxes a binding constraint in the use
of revenues from ET, we label it ‘broad Pigouvian’.
A third set of studies, often associated with earlier
contributions to the environmental tax reform lit-
erature, suggest that ET revenues can be used to
achieve a ‘double-dividend’; one from the correction
of the environmental externality, the other from the
substitution of ET to other taxes with larger excess
burdens, chiefly the personal income tax. Under
certain conditions, such a ‘recycling of tax instru-
ments’ would increase both social welfare and the
overall efficiency of the economy (Bovenberg andDe
Mooij 1994; Goulder 1995; EC 2011; Parry 1998; Lai
2009; Bento and Jacobsen, 2007; Bosquet 2000;
Schöb 2003). A common assumption to these three
strands of literature is that governments maximize
a social welfare function; yet the public choice lit-
erature proposes an alternative vision of govern-
ment, the Leviathan model, which maximizes
revenues instead of social welfare. This change of
objective function allows to formulate a fourth alter-
native hypothesis about how governments use ET,
which is especially insightful for situations where
governments’ electoral accountability is imperfect
(Kirchgassner and Schneider 2003; Congleton
1992; Morse 2006; Fredriksson and Svensson
2003). A Leviathan government exploits the fact
that ET are the least unpopular of all fiscal levies,
because of the citizens’ favourable outlook on the
protection of the environment (EU Commission,
2014; Thalmann 2004), to maximize tax revenues
at the lowest political cost. Governments would
therefore insist in their resorting to ET, irrespective
of the efficiency at achieving environmental goals;
moreover, they would redistribute ET revenues to
secure a power base and/or maximize electoral sup-
port (Aidt 1998, 2010; Fredriksson and Sterner 2005;
Duit, Feindt, and Meadowcroft 2016).
Our strategy consists in successively testing the
empirical restrictions that the theoretical literature
associates to each of these alternative interpretations
of ET, to check which one is best supported by the
data. To verify the strict Pigouvian hypothesis, we
compare the intensity with which each country
resorted to ET to their success in achieving the
GHG reduction target. A positive correlation between
the country’s relative distance from the target and its
use of ET confirms that ET are adopted to (and
effective at) correcting the negative environmental
externality, because if ET reduce the observed emis-
sions the difference increases. Table 1 provides
a description of the variable. For the broad
Pigouvian interpretation, which insists on the consis-
tency in the use of taxing and spending instruments
in environmental policy, we check the baseline
requirement that countries that resort to ET more
also spend more for the general protection of the
environment. As for the double dividend hypothesis,
we verify whether countries actually substitute ET to
personal income taxation (or to other revenue
sources), to reduce the distortionary effects of high
marginal tax rates. Finally, we directly test the
Leviathan hypothesis, by verifying whether ET reven-
ues are positively correlated to expenditure pro-
grammes with a high redistributive and vote-buying
potential.
This type of analysis faces two fundamental diffi-
culties, which the empirical literature has failed to
address so far. The first is that the distance from the
environmental target can be either negative or posi-
tive. As Figure 1 shows, countriesmay either fall short
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of their target, and therefore be supposed to intensify
their environmental policies; or they may go beyond
it and may in principle relax their fiscal efforts. To
account for this difference, we distinguish between
countries with a positive difference with respect to the
target, i.e., those that have already achieved or even
done better than it, from those with a negative differ-
ence, i.e., those which still have to attain their target.
The second problem is the choice of the proper
fiscal indicator to measure the effects of ET. The
theoretical literature is not univocal in this respect.
Strict Pigouvian models advise using ET rates as the
policy choice variable (Baumol and Oates 1988;
Sandmo 2010). Revenue-based measures of fiscal
effort, such as the ratio of ET revenues over total tax
revenues, seem instead more appropriate for the
other three explanations (Schöb 2003). In particular,
the ET’s efficiency at correcting the externality also
affects the choice between either a rate-based or
a revenue-based indicator of the government’s effort
at reducing the externality. If governments actually
use ET in a Pigouvian way and these taxes are effec-
tive at reducingGHGemissions, we should observe in
those countries higher marginal ET rates but lower
ET revenues than the sample average, since the high
tax rates reduce the externality and the revenue
source with it. Yet, if ETs are inefficient at correcting
the externality and governments still acted in
a Pigouvian way, the revenue source would still
exist, so that bothmarginal rates and revenues should
be higher than the sample average. To sort out this
problem, we estimate the model using proxies for
both ET rates and revenues. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate
the average values of these two indicators of environ-
mental fiscal efforts in the chosen sample. According
to Eurostat, our data source, ‘ . . . an environmental
tax is a tax whose base is a physical unit (or a proxy of
a physical unit) of something that has a proven, spe-
cific negative impact on the environment’. ET then
fall within the following economic sectors: energy,
transport, pollution, water resources.
Furthermore, as the two alternative visions of
government (welfare vs. revenue maximizing)
imply categorically different uses of ET, one must
control for the politico-institutional environment
in which ET policies are decided and implemented.
The positive political economy literature concurs
that the redistributive effects between producers
and consumers/voters that ET generate are a good
indicator of the goals that governments pursue in
their environmental policies. Governments in fact
tilt such redistribution in favour of either group
according to their electoral vs. lobbying account-
ability, which depends on the political and
Table 1. Description of the variables.
Name Definitions and units Source
GHG Greenhouse gas emissions in Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) sectors – million tons of CO2 equivalent Eurostat
TARGET EU Commission decision 2017/1471 of 10 August 2017, modifying decision 2013/162/UE aiming at revising the
yearly allocations of the emission quotas of member States for the 2017–2020 period
GHG_DIFF (Target – GHG observed)/GHG observed Own calculations
ET_REV Total environmental taxes as percentage of total revenues from taxes and social contributions (including imputed
social contributions)
Eurostat
OTHER_REV Total receipts from taxes and social contributions (including imputed social contributions) after deduction of
amounts assessed but unlikely to be collected minus environmental tax revenues as % of GDP
Eurostat
ET_RATE Variation of the ratio between energy tax revenues and final energy consumption calculated for a calendar year.
Energy tax revenues are measured in euro 2010 (deflated with the gross market product implicit deflator) and the
final energy consumption in TOE (tons of oil equivalent), therefore the ITR on energy is measured in EUR per TOE.
Eurostat
ENV_EXP Total general government expenditure for environmental protection as a percentage of GDP Eurostat
GS_EXP Total general government expenditure for general public services as a percentage of GDP. This item includes general
transfers between different government levels for government services, general public services, basic research,
general services
Eurostat
SC_EXP Total general government expenditure for social protection as a percentage of GDP. This item includes aid for
sickness and disability, family and children, old age, unemployment, survivors, housing, social exclusion and social
protection.
Eurostat
DEBT Government consolidated gross debt as percentage of GDP Eurostat
ENERGY_INT Energy intensity of GDP in purchasing power standards (PPS), Kilograms of oil equivalent (KGOE) per thousand euro
in purchasing power standards (PPS)
Eurostat
ENERGY_DEP Energy dependence, net imports divided by the sum of gross inland energy consumption plus bunkers % Eurostat
G_GDP_PC Annual growth rate of GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international US$) World Bank WDI
GDP_PC GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international US$) World Bank WDI
MARTAX Income Tax, Top statutory personal income tax rates OECD
RLE Rule of law, composite measures of governance in units of a standard normal distribution, with mean zero, standard
deviation of one, and running from approximately −2.5 to 2.5
World Bank WGI
VA_IND Industry, value added (% of GDP) World Bank WDI
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institutional framework where environmental pol-
icy decisions are taken (Cadoret and Padovano
2019; Polk and Schmutzler 2005; Fredriksson and
Sterner 2005; Kirchgassner and Schneider 2003;
Aidt 1998, 2010). Controlling for these variables
allows also to assess in which institutional environ-
ment ET function better (Congleton, 2002).
Naturally, countries dispose of other policy instru-
ments that can be adopted to achieve environmen-
tal goals, like regulation, the creation of markets
and so on. We control for them through the
country fixed effects, since regulation and other
non-fiscal environmental policies tend to remain
stable features of each country over time (OECD
2011; Botta and Kozluk, 2014).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 illustrates the empirical strategy, the data-
set and the specification of the model. The results of
the estimates about the strict Pigouvian hypothesis
are discussed in section 3. In section 4 we verify the
broad Pigouvian interpretation. Section 5 examines
the evidence related to the double dividend
Figure 1. Mean over the period of the relative difference of GHG emissions from the target (Target – observed GHG)/Target.
Figure 2. Total revenues from environmental taxes as a percentage of total revenues from taxes and social contributions (including
imputed social contributions).
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hypothesis, while section 6 discusses the evidence
supporting the Leviathan interpretation. Section 7
summarizes the conclusions of the analysis and pre-
sents its policy implications.
II. Empirics
Empirical testing strategy
Bringing the four theoretical hypotheses to the data
first involves selecting the dependent variables,
which will be regressed on the main variables of
interest related to each hypothesis, plus three sets
of controls: the economic variables X, the energy
characteristics and environmental policy variables
W and the politico-institutional variables Z. The
variables included in these vectors are selected
according to the relevant empirical literature, to
maximize the comparability of our results with
those of previous studies. All models are estimated
dynamically via the Arellano-Bond GMM estima-
tor with robust standard errors. This estimating
technique has the important advantage of account-
ing for potential endogeneity problems. The Levin-
Lin-Chu unit-root test confirms that all variables
are stationary (Table A1 in the Appendix).
As a robustness check, we repeat the same esti-
mates via the within estimator, examining also
different explanatory variables. The results, never
qualitatively different from those obtained via
Arellano-Bond GMM, are reported in the
Appendix Table A2, A3, A4, A5 and A6.
Our empirical strategy proceeds in four steps, each
one dealing with one of the hypotheses under test.
Strict Pigouvian hypothesis
The first step is testing the strict Pigouvian interpre-
tation. As the endogenous variable we select the
relative difference between the country’s GHG emis-
sions target and the observed emissions, normalized
by observed emissions, namedGHG_DIFF.We con-
sider Greenhouse gas emissions in Effort Sharing
Decision (ESD) sectors expressed in million tons
CO2 equivalent. The ESD sets emission targets for
member states for each year until 2020, according to
Decision 406/2009 – Annexe II; targets are derived
from the official source, the EU Commission
Decision n. 2017/1471. Compliance with targets is
reviewed every year. Normalizing the distance separ-
ating the country from the target captures the coun-
try’s effort in attaining their GHG target. This
variable is also separated in two groups, one includ-
ing countries that are doing better than their target
(usually, the Eastern European ones) and have thus
a positive difference; the otherwith the countries that
are underscoring their specific target (typically the
Western Europeans ones) and show a negative dif-
ference. The specification of the empiricalmodel is as
follows:
Figure 3. ET_RATE as a proxy for the effective marginal tax rate of environmental taxation.
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GHG DIFFit ¼ α1GHG DIFFit1 þ β1TET RATEit
þ β1RET REVit þ γ1Xit þ δ1Wit
þ θ1Zit þ φi þ it
(1)
where i identifies the country and t the year; φ are
the country fixed effects. Since the attainment of
the GHG target is progressive over time, the equa-
tion includes the lagged dependent variable. We
consider the covariate ET_REV endogenous in
the model, since the distance from the GHG target
variable may determine the countries’ resort to ET,
but at the same time the use of ET may affect the
countries’ distance from the GHG target.
As already anticipated, the strict Pigouvian
hypothesis requires examining two complementary
measures of ET, the ET rates and the ET revenues.
The variable ET_REV represents revenues of envir-
onmental taxes, measured as the ratio of environ-
mental tax revenues over total fiscal revenues.
ET_RATE is instead a proxy for the effective mar-
ginal incidence of environmental taxation, speci-
fied as the variation of the implicit energy tax rate
calculated over two successive years (see Table 1 for
the detailed description of the variable). As men-
tioned in the introduction, if ET are (used as)
Pigouvian taxes and prove effective at reducing
GHG emissions, the negative correlation between
ET rates and GHG emissions should reduce the tax
base for the ET. If, instead, ET are inefficient at
correcting the externality, even in the case when
governments acted in a Pigouvian way, the extern-
ality would still remain and the revenue source
with it. In this case we should observe both high
ET rates and ET revenues. We estimate the model
using both ET_RATE and ET_REV as proxies for
the country’s environmental fiscal effort. The low
correlation coefficient between the two indicators
(r = 0,17) legitimizes the use of both as alternatives
in our analysis. We hold that the strict Pigouvian
hypothesis is confirmed if there is a positive corre-
lation between GHF_DIFF and ET_RATE and
a non significant one on ET_REV.
Among the economic variables of vector X, we
begin by examining the complex relationship
between income-related variables and pollution.
A first theoretical linkage is the well-known envir-
onmental Kuznets curve, which posits a positive
relationship between economic development and
environmental degradation at low levels of per
capita income that turns negative when citizens-
taxpayers’ support for environmental protection
begins to improve environmental quality (Arrow
et al. 1995). Moreover, the ‘green’ neoclassical
growth models (Ordás Criado, Valente, and
Stengos 2011; Brock and Taylor 2010) show that
the instantaneous growth rate of emissions per
capita is negatively correlated with the level of
emissions per capita (a ‘defensive effect’), but posi-
tively correlated with the growth rate of output per
capita (a ‘scale effect’). These papers argue that
combining economic growth with an increasing
environmental quality requires a sufficiently high
rate of emission-reducing technical progress, espe-
cially investments in pollution abatement activities.
Ordás Criado, Valente, and Stengos (2011) test this
hypothesis on a variety of pollutant agents in
a sample of 25 European countries, but not for
GHG reduction. We complement their analysis by
inserting in Equation (1) both indicators of per
capita economic growth (G_GDPPC) and of per
capita income levels (GDP_PC) in logs, and let the
sign on the latter be determined by the empirical
analysis. The square of the log of GDP_PC is intro-
duced to test for the environmental Kutznets curve.
As for the controls for energy and environmental
policies of vector W, we first consider the energy
intensity in production (variable ENERGY_INT),
specified as the log of the kilogram of oil equivalent
per 1000 euros worth of products. The variable is
introduced in logs. The expected sign on this covariate
is always negative, since ENERGY_INT increase
GHG emissions, reducing the value of GHG_DIFF.
We have also considered the country’s energy depen-
dency rate (ENERGY_DEP), which indicates how
much an economy relies on imports tomeet its energy
requirements. This variable is an indirect measure of
the country’s competitiveness, since it accounts for the
weight of the imported energy on the actual costs of
domestic products; as such, it should be positively
correlated with the country’s propensity to introduce
ET. Finally, we include a linear TREND that accounts
for technological progress.
The variables in vector Z capture how similar the
country’s political and institutional framework is to
the Leviathan extreme case. Holding constant the
covariates in vectors W and X, the arguments of
Z tell us why, for a given use of ET, some countries
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are more efficient than others at reaching their GHG
target. Among the many variables that we have con-
trolled for, those that have most consistently shown
some explanatory power are RLE, an indicator of the
degree of enforcement of the law in the country, from
the World Bank World Governance Indicators.
Greater values of RLE suggest that government deci-
sions are more efficiently implemented, which mini-
mizes government discretion that would instead be
magnified in a Leviathan world. A second variable is
VA_IND, i.e., the share of value added from industry
on total GDP. This variable is commonly used in the
literature to capture the influence of lobbies
(Fredriksson, 2004; Cadoret and Padovano 2019). It
reflects the idea that the greater is the value added of
an industry, the higher are the producers’ costs of
coordination in order to get organized as a lobby.3
The predicted impact of VA_IND on GHG_DIFF is
therefore positive, since more value added increases
lobbying costs, which reduces observed GHG thus
increasing GHG_DIFF.
Broad Pigouvian hypothesis
The second step of the analysis is testing the broad
Pigouvian hypothesis. To this end we estimate
a similar model to the one adopted for the strict
Pigouvian but using the countries’ expenditures
for environmental protection, ENV_PROT, as
a percentage of GDP, as the dependent variable.
Environmental protection expenditures are the
most comprehensive aggregate of government
outlays for environmental purposes for which
Eurostat collects information. The broad
Pigouvian interpretation imposes consistency
between environmental policy instruments:
hence a greater resort to ET should be reflected
in higher expenditures for environmental protec-
tion (Duit, Feindt, and Meadowcroft 2016; Pearce
and Palmer 2001). Equation (2) is therefore spe-
cified with ET_REV as the main explanatory vari-
able of:
ENV PROTit ¼ α2ENV PROTit1 þ β2ET REVit
þ γ2Xit þ δ2Wit þ θ2Zit þ φi þ ηit
(2)
In vector X we have considered proxies for other
revenue sources other than ET_REV that can finance
environmental expenditures. To avoid problems of
multicollinearity, the arguments of X have been
included in the estimates when ET_REV was not.
The first is the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio, mea-
sured as the general government consolidated gross
debt and labelled DEBT. On the one hand, as public
debt relaxes the (contemporary) government’s budget
constraint, this variable should be positively corre-
lated with total government expenditures, including
those for environmental protection; on the other
hand, highly indebted countries might be forced to
rebalance their finances and then be forced to cut
spending on the environment, which should result
in a negative correlation. The sign of the coefficient is
left for the empirical analysis to settle. As the service
of the debt is often a non-negligible expenditure item,
we consider the covariate DEBT endogenous in the
model. Furthermore, we have included the non-
environmental taxes (variable OTHER_REV), mea-
sured as the difference between total tax revenues and
environmental tax revenues, normalized by GDP. As
more revenues relax a binding constraint, the
expected sign is positive.
The double dividend hypothesis
The third step of the analysis focuses on the double
dividend hypothesis. As it is standard in the litera-
ture (Schöb 2003; Parry 1998; Goulder 1995), we
verify this hypothesis by introducing a proxy for
marginal tax pressure in the equation that explains
the government resort to ET. The early environmen-
tal tax reform literature considered substitutions
chiefly between ET and personal income taxes, as
they carried the largest distortionary effects. More
recent contributions to this literature have extended
the policy of ‘revenue recycling’ also to other taxes,
such as the general consumption taxes. Value added
taxes, however, show a very low within variance,
which makes them difficult to disentangle from the
country fixed effects. We have therefore focused on
the variable MARTAX, the top legislated marginal
tax rate on personal income, from OECD. Equation
(3) is therefore a tax setting equation for ET.
3Demania et al. (2005), Fredriksson (1997) and Conconi (2003) are among the various papers that specify lobbying power in this way. Other lobbying variables
considered are MAN_VA, the share of value added from the manufacturing industry on total GDP, as well as AGR_VA, the diffusion of lobbies from the
agricultural sector. They prove collinear with VA_IND.
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ET REVit ¼ α3ET REVit1 þ μ1MARTAXit
þ β1Xit þ γ1Wit þ δ1Zit þ φi þ$it
(3)
A negative correlation between MARTAX and the
ET_REV is evidence of substitution of ET for per-
sonal income taxes to reduce marginal excess
burdens.
Leviathan hypothesis
Finally, for the Leviathan hypothesis our empirical
strategy exploits the implication that imperfectly
accountable governments maximize revenues to
secure their power base at the lowest political cost.
To this end, such a government should channel the
ET revenues to highly redistributive expenditures,
which can target specific groups, thus yielding
higher political returns, as opposed to general pur-
pose, public-good like expenditure items, which
benefit the population at large in a rather undiffer-
entiated manner (Aidt 1998, 2010; Kirchgassner and
Schneider 2003). We therefore regress two quite
opposite types of expenditure items, social expendi-
tures (labelled SC_EXP) and expenditures for gen-
eral services (GS_EXP) on ET revenues. Both are
normalized by GDP. According to the Eurostat clas-
sification itself, social protection expenditures are
the ones with the strongest redistributive profile,
while general services instead are the closest proxy
to the concept of public goods (see Table 1 for the
disaggregation of these expenditure items). The
stark difference between these expenditure items
maximizes the power of our test that is undermined
by the rather low share of ET over total revenues. To
confirm the Leviathan hypothesis, we should find
a positive correlation between ET_REV and
SC_EXP, but not with GS_EXP. A lack of statistical
significance on the coefficients of ET_REV on both
expenditure items is instead consistent with the
implication of the Pigouvian hypothesis that ET
are sufficient to correct the externality, and revenues
should not be targeted to any specific expenditure.
We estimate the following model:
Yit ¼ α1Yit1 þ β1ET REVit þ γ1Xit þ δ1Wit
þ θ1Zit þ φi þ ηit (4)
Where vector Yit includes SC_EXP and GS_EXP.
Sample
The sample encompasses 28 EU countries that,
through Decision 406/2009, have: A) committed
themselves to collectively reduce GHG to 70% of
their 1990 levels by the year 2020; and B) agreed to
a series of country-specific targets, to account for
the economic and environmental starting points of
each country, especially those of the former Eastern
European nations (Benjamin et al. 2015). They are
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden and the the United Kingdom. The
time interval covers the period 2005–2017, for
which Eurostat provides coherent data for the
Greenhouse gas emissions in Effort Sharing
Decision (ESD) sectors; furthermore, 2005 is the
beginning year for the effort sharing policy in the
attainment of the GHG target. Each variable thus
features a maximum of 13*28 = 364 observations,
quite enough to obtain efficient estimates. Table 1
describes the characteristics of the variables and
their data sources, while Table 2 provides the
descriptive statistics. Table 3–6 present the results
that are pertinent to the objective of our analysis.
III. Testing for the strict Pigouvian hypotheses
The estimates of Equation (1) about the strict
Pigouvian hypothesis are reported in Table 3.
If we consider the whole sample (models 1–2), the
results appear consistent with the strict Pigouvian
hypothesis in the cases where ET are effective at
reducing the GHG emissions, thereby rising
GHG_DIFF. Model 1 assumes ET_REV to be endo-
genous, but the coefficient is not statistically signifi-
cant. ET_RATE has instead the expected positive
sign. This pattern confirms that high marginal rates
of ET actually reduce the environmental externality
represented by the GHG emissions; this widens the
positive gap from the GHG target for countries that
have already achieved their objective, or reduces the
negative one for those that still have to attain it. Such
a reduction of the externality also shrinks the tax base
for ET. This result is slightly more evident in the
subsamples of the underachieving countries (models
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3–4) than of the overachieving ones (model 5–6).
This pattern further corroborates the strict
Pigouvian hypothesis. The size of the correction is
rather large, since the estimated coefficient suggests
that, if the countries in the sample increase their
effective marginal tax pressure for ET by just 1 euro
per ton equivalent, this will increase the relative dis-
tance from the target by 0.0006 (Model 2 in Table 3).
As the average value of GHG_DIFF in the sample is
0.0694 (6,94%), an increase of ET_RATE by 1 euro
will increase GHG_DIFF by 7%. In any event, the
estimates show that, for both groups of countries, an
increase of the ET_RATE increase GHG_DIFF, as the
strict Pigouvian hypothesis predicts. Coming to the
economic controls, as predicted by Ordás Criado,
Valente, and Stengos (2011), we observe the scale
effect for the whole sample, (variable G_GDP_PC)
with a negative sign, which implies that faster growth
brings about more emissions. Moreover, the ‘defen-
sive’ effect (variable GDP_PC), is negative, implying
that, in the long run, countries fail to revert to a steady
state ofmore environmentally sustainable growth. No
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
VARIABLES Unit N Mean Median Standard deviation Min Max
GHG_DIFF relative difference 364 0.0694 .0395 0.167 −0.195 0.707
ET_REV % 364 7.263 7.130 1.692 4.150 11.63
OTHER_REV % 364 33.79 32.865 5.715 21.75 46.13
ET_RATE variation in €/TOE 364 3.597 1.530 14.75 −49.79 83.35
ENV_EXP % 364 0.763 0.70 0.341 −0.300 1.900
GS_EXP % 364 6.393 6.30 1.897 2.800 12.90
SC_EXP % 364 16.40 16.50 3.906 7.900 25.60
DEBT % 364 60.48 54.50 34.70 3.700 178.9
logENERGY_INT logarithm 364 4.980 4.942 0.285 4.039 5.717
ENERGY_DEP % 364 56.10 56.485 26.75 −50.92 104.2
G_GDP_PC % 364 1.728 1.770 3.920 −14.56 23.94
logGDP_PC logarithm 364 10.37 10.367 0.371 9.427 11.49
MAR_TAX % 299 41.06 45.00 13.17 15.00 62.68
VA_IND % 364 23.46 23.513 5.868 9.368 38.52
RLE [−2.5;2.5] 364 1.134 1.129 0.611 −0.138 2.100
Table 3. Tests of the strict Pigouvian hypothesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES GHG_DIFF GHG_DIFF
GHG_DIFF
(GHG_DIFF <0)
GHG_DIFF
(GHG_DIFF <0)
GHG_DIFF
(GHG_DIFF>0)
GHG_DIFF
(GHG_DIFF >0)
GHG_DIFFt-1 0.3877*** 0.2922*** 0.0055 0.1002** 0.3046** 0.4779***
(0.1118) (0.0239) (0.2309) (0.0496) (0.1547) (0.1011)
ET_REV −0.0009 0.0074 −0.0067
(0.0108) (0.0119) (0.0089)
ET_RATE 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0002 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0003***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
G_GDP_PC −0.0021** −0.0026*** −0.0002 −0.0027* −0.0051***
(0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0010)
logGDP_PC 4.8135 −0.6739*** 2.5782 −0.6899*** −1.0490 −0.5485***
(4.3878) (0.0316) (5.8557) (0.0400) (2.5792) (0.0973)
logGDP_PC2 −0.2631 −0.1528 0.0147
(0.2148) (0.2771) (0.1266)
logENERGY_INT −0.1570** −0.2150*** −0.3486*** −0.3933*** −0.1518 −0.0946**
(0.0699) (0.0193) (0.0716) (0.0271) (0.1094) (0.0434)
VA_IND 0.0113*** 0.0124*** 0.0082** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0092***
(0.0029) (0.0013) (0.0035) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0016)
RLE −0.0151 0.0306*** 0.0433 0.0155 0.1017*** 0.0374**
(0.0288) (0.0105) (0.0578) (0.0175) (0.0377) (0.0167)
TREND 0.0072*** 0.0074*** 0.0025 0.0117*** 0.0092***
(0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0011)
Constant −21.0660 7.7637*** −8.7689 9.0987*** 9.7913 5.8300***
(22.4496) (0.3915) (31.1402) (0.4992) (13.4581) (1.2001)
Observations 308 308 126 126 182 182
Number of id 28 28 17 17 24 24
AR1 p value 0.009 0.010 0.251 0.018 0.124 0.018
AR2 p value 0.277 0.229 0.254 0.546 0.131 0.067
Sargan test p value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation, in (1) (3) and (5) variable ET_REV is assumed to be endogenous. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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evidence is found, instead, of the environmental
Kutznets curve effect, possibly because, in line with
Harbaugh, Levinson, and Molloy Wilson (2006), the
countries of the sample are fairly homogenous in
terms of economic development. The estimates also
confirm the expected negative sign on energy inten-
sity in production. The positive value on TREND
confirms its interpretation as a proxy for technologi-
cal progress, which reduces air pollution, thus
increasing the positive distance (or reducing the nega-
tive one) from the target. The latter effect seems
stronger, since the coefficient on TREND is signifi-
cant among the underachieving countries of Western
Europe. Among the politico-institutional variables
the positive sign on VA_IND confirms that more
value added increases lobbying costs, which in turn
increase GHG_DIFF. No significant difference seems
to exist between the two subgroups of countries. The
coefficient on the government efficiency at imple-
menting policies is positive too and quite significant;
once more this effect is concentrated in the Western
European subsample. This suggests that there is less
scope for Leviathan like behaviour in the pursuit of
the environmental policy goals in the more estab-
lished western democracies. The other politico-
institutional variables usually turn out not statistically
significant, because of their lowwithin variance, while
the between variance is captured by the fixed effects.
Both the AR and the Sargan tests confirm the validity
of the instruments.
IV. Testing the broad Pigouvian hypothesis
The combination of a positive coefficient on
ET_RATE and a lack of statistical significance on
ET_REV is a necessary, but not sufficient evidence
to conclude in support of the strict Pigouvian
hypothesis. We cannot yet rule out the possibility
that ET are used for other environmental concerns,
not necessarily the reduction of GHG. If it were so,
the results would be consistent also with the broad
Pigouvian hypothesis, which posits that the com-
plexity of environmental policy goals requires that
all environmental policy instruments be directed to
the attainment of environmental goals. In other
words, the support for the strict Pigouvian hypoth-
esis cannot exclude the broad Pigouvian
interpretation because the restricted nature of the
dependent variable used (GHG_DIFF), too limited
to represent the whole environmental policy of the
country. To overcome this problem, Equation (2)
features the countries’ expenditures for environ-
mental protection in percentage of GDP as the
dependent variable (ENV_PROT). Environmental
protection expenditures are the most comprehen-
sive aggregate of government outlays for environ-
mental purposes for which Eurostat collects
information. Moreover, since the broad Pigouvian
hypothesis posits that environmental tax revenues
must be spent for environmental concerns, we con-
centrate the analysis on ET_REV and check
whether they remain not statistically significant.
Table 4 illustrates the results.
All models of Table 4 show a negative correla-
tion between ET revenues and environmental pro-
tection expenditures, albeit not a statistically
significant one. This is evidence against the broad
Pigouvian hypothesis, which predicts a positive
and significant sign. The dynamic structure of the
estimating procedure ensures that this result does
not depend on the time difference between the
moments when revenues are collected and when
they are spent. Higher debt levels seem instead to
be correlated with environmental protection
expenditures. The income-related variables reveal
that faster economic growth is associated with
greater expenditures for environmental protection
inWestern European countries; the opposite seems
true for the Eastern ones, possibly because the
production technologies in that subsample are
more environmentally friendly. All the other vari-
ables basically keep the same signs and significance
levels of the estimates of Equation (1). Once more,
the AR and the Sargan tests confirm the validity of
the instruments.
V. Testing the double dividend hypothesis
The double dividend hypothesis refers to
a substitution of ET for other taxes characterized
by larger and more distortive excess burdens. As
the excess burden of taxation increases with the
square of the marginal tax rate, earlier contributions
to this literature concur in pointing out the personal
income taxes as the natural candidate for substitu-
tion (OECD 2011; Schöb 2003; Parry 1998; Goulder
1995). This hypothesis gained some prominence in
the European policy debate at the turn of the
10 I. CADORET ET AL.
century, when the Red-Green coalition government
in Germany placed it with great emphasis in its
political platform. Indeed, such debate occurred
during the sample period of our analysis.
In the estimates of Equation (3) the covariate of
interest is MARTAX, the proxy for effective mar-
ginal tax pressure in personal income taxation. We
consider MARTAX as endogenous in the estima-
tion. A negative sign on MARTAX reveals an
attempt to lower high-excess burden taxes with
environmental ones, i.e., a proper attempt to attain
a double dividend.
The estimates show that, when we consider
ET_REV, the negative and highly significant coeffi-
cient onMARTAX is evidence of exchange of ETwith
other taxes with the personal income tax, especially
among the countries that have already attained their
target (model 3). In particular, the value of the coeffi-
cient reveals that a reduction by 1 percentage point
of marginal tax pressure on personal income implies
a 0.0471 percentage point increase of ET_REV, a non-
negligible value (model 1 in Table 5). Countries
apparently have still a fairly large leeway in pursuing
a double dividend type of fiscal strategy. This result
contrasts with the implications of the mostly theore-
tical or simulated models that cast doubts on the
possibility to achieve a double dividend because of
large tax interaction effects (Bovenberg and DeMooij
Table 4. Tests of the broad Pigouvian hypothesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ENV_EXP ENV_EXP
ENV_EXP
(GHG_DIFF < 0)
ENV_EXP
(GHG_DIFF < 0)
ENV_EXP
(GHG_DIFF > 0)
ENV_EXP
(GHG_DIFF > 0)
ENV_EXPt-1 0.4509*** 0.1863** 0.0633 −0.0366 0.1992*** −0.0944
(0.0163) (0.0932) (0.0784) (0.2052) (0.0486) (0.1434)
ET_REV −0.0093 0.0065 −0.0079
(0.0090) (0.0135) (0.0112)
DEBT 0.0047** 0.0015 0.0035
(0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0035)
OTHER_REV −0.0093 −0.0129 0.0018
(0.0097) (0.0187) (0.0176)
G_GDP_PC −0.0035*** −0.0033** −0.0084*** −0.0068* 0.0031** 0.0022
(0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0038) (0.0015) (0.0033)
logGDP_PC −0.6111*** −0.1901 −0.0962 −0.4031 −0.8832*** −0.3679
(0.0899) (0.3042) (0.3128) (0.6319) (0.3097) (0.6925)
logENERGY_INT −0.4074*** −0.3401* −0.0598 0.3267 −0.4893* −1.0789***
(0.1256) (0.1927) (0.2416) (0.2106) (0.2962) (0.4173)
VA_IND 0.0087*** 0.0113 −0.0042 0.0167 −0.0106** −0.0232
(0.0028) (0.0077) (0.0043) (0.0211) (0.0043) (0.0310)
RLE 0.1297** 0.0699 0.1702 0.4312*** 0.1666 −0.2707
(0.0543) (0.1346) (0.1726) (0.0549) (0.2108) (0.3088)
TREND −0.0109** −0.0191* −0.0055 0.0030 −0.0187 −0.0486*
(0.0049) (0.0106) (0.0091) (0.0124) (0.0114) (0.0253)
Constant 8.5480*** 4.0867 1.7334 2.6316 12.3803*** 10.8437*
(1.1164) (3.3709) (4.0891) (6.2261) (3.2608) (5.9042)
Observations 308 308 126 126 182 182
Number of id 28 28 17 17 24 24
AR1 p value 0.005 0.11 0.43 0.83 0.04 0.045
AR2 p value 0.27 0.19 0.29 0.24 0.46 0.32
Sargan test
p value
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation, in (2) (4) and (6) the variable DEBT is assumed to be endogenous. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 5. Tests of the ‘double dividend’ hypothesis.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ET_REV
ET_REV (GHG_DIFF
< 0)
ET_REV (GHG_DIFF
> 0)
ET_REVt-1 0.5914*** 0.2984* 0.6760***
(0.1115) (0.1540) (0.1369)
MAR_TAX −0.0471*** −0.0349 −0.0232**
(0.0166) (0.0258) (0.0106)
DEBT 0.0122*** 0.0110*** 0.0159***
(0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0043)
G_GDP_PC −0.0185*** −0.0064 −0.0221**
(0.0070) (0.0063) (0.0109)
RLE −0.3667 −0.8202*** −0.1478
(0.2808) (0.3157) (0.7277)
TREND −0.0191** −0.0596*** −0.0234
(0.0097) (0.0109) (0.0159)
Constant 4.5203*** 7.1832*** 2.3734
(1.2141) (2.5996) (1.5919)
Observations 253 112 141
Number of id 23 15 19
AR1 p value 0.006 0.03 0.010
AR2 p value 0.99 0.52 0.40
Sargan test
p value
1.00 1.00 1.00
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation, variable MARTAX is assumed
to be endogenous.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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1994). Rather the welfare gains associated with pre-
vious distortionary effects of taxation appear to be
significant (Parry 1998), at least in the sample under
study. Countries that must still reduce GHG emis-
sions seem more prone to substitute ET (model 4).
These results are obtained controlling for the coun-
tries revenue requirements, proxied by the variable
DEBT,which has the expected positive and significant
coefficient. This result holds on all model specifica-
tions and samples. All the other variables maintain
their signs and levels of significance; the diagnostics
ensures the validity of the instruments.
VI. Direct tests of the Leviathan hypothesis
So far, the evidence is mostly in favour of the strict
Pigouvian hypothesis; this rules out the possibility to
accept the Leviathan hypothesis a contrario, i.e., as the
opposite view to hypotheses that are not supported by
the data. In this context, it is important to directly test
the hypothesis that governments behave like
Leviathans in environmental policy; if such hypoth-
esis is rejected the results in favour of the strict
Pigouvian hypothesis would be further corroborated.
To perform this robustness check we have estimated
Equation (4) for general services expenditures
(GS_EXP) and social protection expenditures
(SC_EXP), two quite opposite types of expenditure
items: the first is closest to the definition of public
goods, while the second is the most redistributive
expenditure category within the Eurostat classifica-
tion. Table 6 reports the results of the estimates of
Equation (4) for these two dependent variables.
As for GS_EXP, the estimated coefficients are
never statistically significant (Table 6). Nor does
ET_REV ever appear to be statistically significantly
correlated with SC_EXP, those in favour of which
a government that is not electorally accountable
should spend the ET revenues, especially in view of
their low political cost (Table 7). The results in Table
7 should be interpreted with caution, however, as the
AR2 tests fail to validate the instruments in models
(1), (2) and (3). In all models where the instruments
are valid, the coefficient on ET_REV is not statistically
significant. The estimates of Equation (4), disaggre-
gated for the two subsamples of overachieving and
underachieving countries, are not qualitatively differ-
ent from these of the whole sample. The other vari-
ables show the expected signs. All in all, there is no
evidence that ET are employed to secure power bases
or for vote buying purposes; this further supports the
results in favour of the strict Pigouvian hypothesis.
Table 6. Tests of the Leviathan hypothesis. Dependent variable: General Services Expenditures (GS_EXP).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES GS_EXP GS_EXP
GS_EXP
(GHG_DIFF < 0)
GS_EXP
(GHG_DIFF < 0)
GS_EXP
(GHG_DIFF > 0)
GS_EXP
(GHG_DIFF > 0)
GS_EXPt-1 0.5947*** 0.4836*** 0.4829*** 0.1534** 0.3911*** 0.2869***
(0.0350) (0.0400) (0.0651) (0.0632) (0.0545) (0.0528)
ET_REV 0.0063 −0.0028 −0.0362
(0.0262) (0.0786) (0.0418)
DEBT 0.0295*** 0.0352*** 0.0282***
(0.0027) (0.0069) (0.0074)
OTHER_REV −0.0115 0.0028 −0.0096
(0.0197) (0.0146) (0.0617)
G_GDP_PC −0.0416*** −0.0416*** −0.0126* −0.0183*** −0.0421*** −0.0441***
(0.0047) (0.0040) (0.0065) (0.0069) (0.0039) (0.0054)
logGDP_PC −1.4331** 1.4698*** −4.0198*** 0.1890 −1.6884** 3.3112***
(0.5762) (0.5479) (0.6408) (1.5217) (0.7558) (1.0954)
RLE 0.8829** 0.5951* 0.1937 0.7731* 1.0560 0.2979
(0.3916) (0.3436) (0.2394) (0.4244) (0.8051) (0.4514)
TREND −0.0182*** −0.1162*** 0.0115 −0.0932*** −0.0362** −0.1851***
(0.0066) (0.0097) (0.0092) (0.0268) (0.0169) (0.0349)
Constant 16.6080*** −13.3461** 45.5019*** 0.6400 20.7684*** −29.5037***
(6.2076) (6.1947) (7.1775) (16.8728) (7.7455) (11.2213)
Observations 308 308 126 126 182 182
Number of id 28 28 17 17 24 24
AR1 p value 0.057 0.056 0.081 0.09 0.09 0.10
AR2 p value 0.427 0.432 0.55 0.185 0.39 0.39
Sargan test p value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation, in (2) (4) and (6) variable DEBT is assumed to be endogenous. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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VII. Conclusions
In the sample under examination, the empirical
analysis of this paper lends support to the inter-
pretation that European governments use ET in
a Pigouvian way. The positive correlation between
ET rates and relative distance from the target,
together with the lack of statistical significance on
measures of environmental tax revenues, suggests
that high Pigouvian tax rates reduce the environ-
mental externality represented by GHG emissions
and therefore shrink the tax base for these taxes,
disincentivizing behaviours that generate GHG.
Both the countries that have already attained their
GHG emissions targets and those that still have to
meet it are characterized by similar levels of corre-
lation between ET rates and reduction of GHG
emissions; this suggests that environmental policies
tend to become embedded in the fiscal system even
after certain policy goals are reached.
The analysis also finds some evidence that gov-
ernments resort to ET to achieve the double divi-
dend of reducing the GHG emissions and the
distorting effects of progressivity in personal income
taxation. Although the evidence in favour of this
motivation appears quantitatively less important
than for the strict Pigouvian hypothesis, it is suffi-
ciently compelling to identify the resort of ET to
reduce excess burdens associated with personal
income taxation. Finally, the evidence in favour of
Leviathan style behaviours is quite inconsistent.
The results of our analysis can be quite helpful for
the same group of counties that, in compliance with
the COP21 agreement, in May 2018 have committed
themselves to further decrease their GHG emissions
by 30% before the year 2030 (EU regulation 2018/
842). In quantitative terms this effort is three times
larger and to be achieved in a slightly shorter time
frame than the one which we have investigated in this
paper. Regulation 2018/42 once more sets a collective
target for the EU and a set of individual efforts of the
member countries, which in some cases can go well
beyond the −30% target and are again by and large
separated along the East-West Europe divide. It is
hence clear that, for such an ambitious policy goal to
be attained, the instrumentsmust be appropriate. The
policy implication deriving from this paper points out
that countries should rely on Pigouvian taxes more,
especially those that have to attain the most demand-
ing reductions. Countries that are near the peak of
their rate-revenues relationship can ‘recycle’ personal
Table 7. Tests of the Leviathan hypothesis. Dependent variable: Social Protection Expenditures (SC_EXP).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES SC_EXP SC_EXP
SC_EXP
(GHG_DIFF < 0)
SC_EXP
(GHG_DIFF < 0)
SC_EXP
(GHG_DIFF > 0)
SC_EXP
(GHG_DIFF > 0)
SC_EXPt-1 0.5679*** 0.5876*** 0.6784*** 0.4275* 0.5897*** 0.6331***
(0.0511) (0.0571) (0.0726) (0.2446) (0.0451) (0.0967)
ET_REV 0.0686 0.0487 −0.0430
(0.0462) (0.1563) (0.0546)
DEBT −0.0010 −0.0207*** −0.0066
(0.0059) (0.0067) (0.0102)
OTHER_REV −0.0319 −0.1306*** 0.0240
(0.0443) (0.0390) (0.0651)
G_GDP_PC −0.1630*** −0.1620*** −0.1850*** −0.1002 −0.1551*** −0.1620***
(0.0099) (0.0086) (0.0181) (0.0659) (0.0041) (0.0083)
logGDP_PC −4.9498*** −4.0651*** −4.6653* −16.6238** −1.9339*** −2.2887***
(1.7341) (1.3835) (2.7882) (6.7352) (0.6562) (0.7726)
RLE 0.3937** 0.7925* 0.2370 0.7834 0.6643* 0.5068
(0.1884) (0.4471) (0.3074) (0.5506) (0.3732) (0.3775)
TREND 0.0765*** 0.0677** 0.0887** 0.2668*** 0.0341*** 0.0382
(0.0220) (0.0294) (0.0348) (0.1013) (0.0098) (0.0326)
Constant 57.3412*** 48.8972*** 54.4994* 190.5833** 25.9914*** 28.3897***
(18.5761) (16.0374) (31.5573) (76.3091) (6.8856) (8.5245)
Observations 308 308 126 126 182 182
Number of id 28 28 17 17 24 24
AR1 p value 0.0057 0.003 0.10 0.94 0.00 0.01
AR2 p value 0.015 0.012 0.03 0.44 0.43 0.33
Sargan test p value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation, in (2) (4) and (6) variable DEBT is assumed to be endogenous. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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income taxes with ET, to achieve the environmental
goal and an overall improvement of the efficiency of
the economy.
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Appendix. Additional tests and estimates
Table A1. Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test.
Without Trend With Trend
VARIABLES Statistic P_Value Statistic P_Value
GHG_DIFF −3.454 0.000*** −3.959 0.000***
ET_REV −3.997 0.000*** −6.548 0.000***
OTHER_REV −3.855 0.000*** −6.318 0.000***
ET_RATE −8.631 0.000*** −7.868 0.000***
ENV_EXP −4.468 0.000*** −6.180 0.000***
GS_EXP −0.605 0.272 −1.466 0.071*
SC_EXP −6.727 0.000*** 5.456 0.000***
DEBT −7.541 0.000*** −2.332 0.009***
logENERGY_INT −5.464 0.000*** −9.284 0.000***
ENERGY_DEP −2.584 0.004*** −3.190 0.000***
G_GDP_PC −9.946 0.000*** −9.224 0.000***
logGDP_PC −2.924 0.001*** −5.971 0.000***
MAR_TAX −1.899 0.028** −5.699 0.000***
VA_IND −6.613 0.000*** −5.289 0.000***
RLE −2;367 0.009*** −2.096 0.018**
Table A2. Tests of the strict Pigouvian hypothesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES GHG_DIFF GHG_DIFF GHG_DIFF GHG_DIFF GHG_DIFF GHG_DIFF
Method GMM GMM Within GMM GMM Within
GHG_DIFFt-1 0.3877*** 0.2922*** 0.5937*** 0.4768*** 0.3429*** 0.6205***
(0.1118) (0.0239) (0.0529) (0.0526) (0.0349) (0.0460)
ET_REV −0.0009 −0.0119
(0.0108) (0.0092)
ET_RATE 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
G_GDP_PC −0.0021** −0.0026*** −0.0028** −0.0022*** −0.0030*** −0.0028**
(0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0012)
logGDP_PC 4.8135 −0.6739*** −0.3597*** 1.7303 −0.5141*** −0.3042***
(4.3878) (0.0316) (0.0627) (3.2731) (0.0365) (0.0525)
logGDP_PC2 −0.2631 −0.1095
(0.2148) (0.1604)
logENERGY_INT −0.1570** −0.2150*** −0.0929*
(0.0699) (0.0193) (0.0535)
ENERGY_DEP −0.0012*** −0.0001 −0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0005)
VA_IND 0.0113*** 0.0124*** 0.0050*** 0.0107*** 0.0122*** 0.0055***
(0.0029) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0014)
RLE −0.0151 0.0306*** 0.0169 0.0265 0.0635*** 0.0293*
(0.0288) (0.0105) (0.0165) (0.0359) (0.0116) (0.0160)
TREND 0.0072*** 0.0074*** 0.0044** 0.0104*** 0.0120*** 0.0068***
(0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0011)
Constant −21.0660 7.7637*** 4.0607*** −6.3097 4.9592*** 2.9932***
(22.4496) (0.3915) (0.8063) (16.6662) (0.3660) (0.5305)
Observations 308 308 336 308 308 336
R2 0.7609 0.7567
Number of id 28 28 28 28 28 28
AR1 p value 0.009 0.010 0.0002 0.0007
AR2 p value 0.277 0.229 0.418 0.278
Sargan test
p value
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
GMM refers to Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation, in (1) and (4) variable ET_REV is assumed to be endogenous. Standard errors in parentheses. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table A3. Tests of the broad Pigouvian hypothesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES ENV_EXP ENV_EXP ENV_EXP ENV_EXP ENV_EXP ENV_EXP ENV_EXP ENV_EXP
Method GMM GMM GMM Within GMM GMM GMM Within
ENV_EXPt-1 0.4349*** 0.4509*** 0.4196*** 0.4250*** 0.2624*** 0.3512*** 0.3224*** 0.4276***
(0.0209) (0.0163) (0.0212) (0.0635) (0.0855) (0.0591) (0.0508) (0.0661)
ET_REV −0.0048 −0.0093 −0.0114 0.0045
(0.0101) (0.0090) (0.0074) (0.0125)
DEBT 0.0038** 0.0035* 0.0022 −0.0006
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0016)
OTHER_REV −0.0071
(0.0088)
G_GDP_PC −0.0049*** −0.0035*** −0.0036*** −0.0019 −0.0047*** −0.0048*** −0.0022 −0.0016
(0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0050) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0051)
logGDP_PC 6.0185 −0.6111*** −0.4844*** −0.5695** −11.4588 −0.3392 −0.4961 −0.6551
(8.7120) (0.0899) (0.0900) (0.2748) (11.7258) (0.2985) (0.3564) (0.3939)
logGDP_PC2 −0.3163 0.5471
(0.4225) (0.5752)
logENERGY_INT −0.4459*** −0.4074*** −0.3377 −0.1546
(0.1284) (0.1256) (0.2108) (0.1241)
ENERGY_DEP −0.0028*** −0.0011 −0.0004 −0.0013
(0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017)
VA_INDUS 0.0089** 0.0087*** 0.0091*** 0.0058 0.0008 0.0196* 0.0129*** 0.0056
(0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0059) (0.0169) (0.0107) (0.0040) (0.0062)
RLE 0.0491 0.1297** 0.2084*** 0.0148 0.0894 −0.0136 −0.0749 0.0234
(0.0874) (0.0543) (0.0502) (0.0819) (0.1551) (0.0907) (0.0719) (0.0879)
TREND −0.0154*** −0.0109** 0.0003 −0.0006 −0.0197* −0.0106* −0.0041 0.0018
(0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0023) (0.0038) (0.0116) (0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0067)
Constant −25.8416 8.5480*** 5.2076*** 6.2292** 62.1932 4.1965 5.3434 7.1758*
(44.7854) (1.1164) (0.8445) (2.7685) (60.0209) (3.6173) (3.7522) (4.0882)
Observations 308 308 308 336 308 308 308 336
Number of id 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
R-squared 0.29 0.29
AR1-pval 0.007 0.005 0.006 , 0.06 0.02 0.02 ,
AR2-pval 0.269 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.22
sargan-pval 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
GMM refers toArellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation, in (5), (6) and (7) variable DEBT is assumed to be endogenous. Standard errors in parentheses. **
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table A4. Tests of the ‘double dividend’ hypothesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ET_REV ET_REV ET_REV ET_REV
GMM GMM Within Within
ET_REVt-1 0.6596*** 0.6540*** 0.8321*** 0.8281***
(0.1233) (0.1203) (0.0449) (0.0426)
MAR_TAX −0.0373** −0.0386** −0.0141* −0.0138*
(0.0180) (0.0172) (0.0073) (0.0073)
DEBT 0.0090** 0.0086** 0.0068** 0.0067**
(0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0026)
G_GDP_PC −0.0259*** −0.0250*** −0.0373*** −0.0376***
(0.0072) (0.0055) (0.0127) (0.0128)
logGDP_PC −18.8319 −2.1224 −8.9629 −1.0230
(39.4684) (1.3130) (8.7528) (0.6773)
logGDP_PC2 0.8130 0.3901
(1.9165) (0.4358)
VA_IND 0.0298 0.0402 0.0247 0.0342
(0.0284) (0.0266) (0.0249) (0.0235)
RLE −0.2849 −0.2894 0.3005 0.2772
(0.3436) (0.3324) (0.2328) (0.2310)
TREND 0.0087 0.0133 0.0071 0.0099
(0.0209) (0.0186) (0.0163) (0.0155)
Constant 110.8605 24.9671* 51.3302 10.8057
(203.0291) (13.6174) (44.1810) (6.4779)
Observations 253 253 276 276
Number of id 23 23 23 23
R2 0.7871 0.7867
AR1 p value 0.006 0.007
AR2 p value 0.74 0.83
Sargan test p value 1.00 1.00
GMM refers to Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation, in (1) and (2) variable MAR_TAX is assumed to be endogenous. Standard errors in parentheses. **
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table A5. Tests of the Leviathan hypothesis. Dependent variable: General Services Expenditures (GS_EXP).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES GS_EXP GS_EXP GS_EXP GS_EXP
GMM Within GMM Within
GS_EXPt-1 0.5994*** 0.5995*** 0.4808*** 0.4681***
(0.0298) (0.0874) (0.0395) (0.0830)
ET_REV 0.0221 −0.0369
(0.0280) (0.0570)
DEBT 0.0296*** 0.0188***
(0.0028) (0.0056)
OTHER_REV −0.0141 −0.0140
(0.0241) (0.0442)
G_GDP_PC −0.0385*** −0.0295*** −0.0338*** −0.0309***
(0.0050) (0.0064) (0.0100) (0.0072)
logGDP_PC 26.1615 0.1190 44.9337 −11.2147
(26.3997) (12.2934) (51.2076) (17.9560)
logGDP_PC2 −1.3543 −2.0885 0.5979
(1.2981) (2.5329) (0.8994)
VA_IND 0.0078 −0.0227 −0.0412
(0.0184) (0.1006) (0.0277)
RLE 0.8116** 1.0249** 0.2941 1.1205**
(0.3509) (0.4341) (0.5144) (0.5248)
TREND −0.0167** −0.0241 −0.1308*** −0.0932***
(0.0073) (0.0150) (0.0387) (0.0254)
Constant −124.0233 6.6182 −238.1910 55.0385
(134.3966) (63.2624) (260.7118) (88.8045)
Observations 308 336 308 336
Number of id 28 28
R2 0.4792 0.5270
AR1 p value 0.05 0.05
AR2 p value 0.42 0.41
Sargan test p value 1.00 1.00
GMM refers to Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation, in (3) variable DEBT is assumed to be endogenous. Standard
errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table A6. Tests of the Leviathan hypothesis. Dependent variable: Social Protection Expenditures (SC_EXP).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES SC_EXP SC_EXP SC_EXP SC_EXP
GMM Within GMM Within
SC_EXPt-1 0.5637*** 0.6453*** 0.5634*** 0.6496***
(0.0328) (0.0422) (0.0492) (0.0447)
ET_REV 0.0238 −0.0276
(0.0578) (0.0526)
DEBT −0.0218*** −0.0027
(0.0057) (0.0046)
OTHER_REV −0.1347*** 0.0013
(0.0371) (0.0333)
G_GDP_PC −0.1575*** −0.1629*** −0.1422*** −0.1628***
(0.0088) (0.0071) (0.0096) (0.0072)
logGDP_PC 49.1363* 25.2546 81.4676*** 24.3807
(26.8805) (15.9450) (21.5474) (15.2027)
logGDP_PC2 −2.5445* −1.3714* −4.2949*** −1.3363*
(1.3008) (0.7948) (1.0781) (0.7506)
VA_IND −0.0694*** −0.0438 −0.0384 −0.0451
(0.0210) (0.0304) (0.0264) (0.0304)
RLE 0.0877 0.3167 0.0408 0.3262
(0.2706) (0.3817) (0.4682) (0.3892)
TREND 0.0424*** 0.0332** 0.1442*** 0.0406*
(0.0088) (0.0156) (0.0311) (0.0238)
Constant −227.1325 −107.4301 −369.5987*** −102.3305
(139.5503) (79.4353) (106.9613) (76.6965)
Observations 308 336 308 336
Number of id 28 28
R2 0.8971 0.8972
AR1 p value 0.001 0.003 0.003
AR2 p value 0.02 0.13 0.13
Sargan test p value 1.00 1.00 1.00
GMM refers to Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation, in (3) variable DEBT is assumed to be endogenous. Standard
errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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